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RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN HIRING
IV. CONCLUSION
Rebuttable presumptions as to a student's domiciliary intent do not
appear to be discriminatory in theory, because all persons are subject
to a factual determination of domiciliary intent under a strict applica-
tion of the law of domicil to voting residency laws. However, the burden
of factual proof is greater for those whose presence in the community
is for what are ordinarily conceived to be "temporary" purposes. Thus
students, unlike persons in other occupational categories, are not able
to vote in local elections after establishing that they dwell in the com-
munity and declaring their domiciliary intent. This discrimination is not
strictly necessary to achieve any legitimate state purpose and cannot be
sustained under the equal protection clause if the "compelling interest"
standard is applicable. That standard should be invoked by the courts
whenever any person is denied the vote, whether or not he be an admit-
ted resident by state standards. A citizen's vote is the foundation of our
representative democracy. Any state abridgement of access to the yote
should be given the closest judicial scrutiny. The equal protection clause
requires no less!
VANCE BARRON, JR.
Here's to You Mrs. Robinson-Title VII and the Hangover Effect of
Prior Racial Discrimination in Hiring
Mrs. Dorothy Robinson applied for a job with the P. Lorillard
Company at its Greensboro, North Carolina, plant following its open-
ing there in 1956.' Mrs. Robinson was referred to the North Carolina
Employment Service Office, an exclusively Black agency. All of Loril-
lard's Black job applicants were referred to that office. During this time,
Lorillard practiced a policy of racial discrimination in its hiring policy.
Mrs. Robinson was allowed to apply only for a position in one of the
"Black" departments of the Company. She accepted a job in the
"Black" service department and had worked for Lorillard from that
time.2
Mrs. Robinson and her fellow employees, both Black and White,
'During the course of the litigation discussed below, P. Lorillard Company changed its name
to Lorillard Corporation.
2Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 319 F. Supp. 835, 836-37 (M.D.N.C. 1970).
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were represented by the Tobacco Workers International Union in their
dealings with the company.3 The Greensboro local was, in fact, the first
integrated local in the entire tobacco industry.' Included in the many
facets of the union and management negotiations were the development
and evolution of a seniority system for the workers at the Greensboro
plant.
A system of seniority was included in the first bargaining agree-
ment between the union and Lorillard in 1957. 5 This agreement estab-
lished seniority rights based upon a worker's tenure in his specific job
in one of nine production and service departments and prohibited trans-
fers between departments.6 Under this plan, Mrs. Robinson could aspire
to no greater position than that of senior floor sweeper in the all-Black
service department. In 1962, the Company negotiated a new contract
which eliminated job seniority, but maintained departmental seniority.,
Under this plan, any worker in a deparment could "bid" for an opening
based on his length of service in the department. Interdepartmental
transfers were allowed, but a transferring employee was required to
forfeit all his accumulated seniority rights and start in his new position
at the lowest entry level. 8 Each day that Mrs. Robinson worked in the
service department she had more to lose in transferring. In 1962, the
Company eliminated racial discrimination in its hiring practices.' The
seniority system continued as outlined above with minor amendments
until Mrs. Robinson went to Federal court to challenge it as racially
discriminatory.
In Robinson v. Lorillard Corporation,"0 the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals upheld an order of the North Carolina Middle District
Court" outlawing the seniority system as it existed, restructuring it with
plant-wide seniority as the determining factor in job mobility and pro-
tection.12 Both the circuit court and the district court held that the




Vd. The job classifications are listed at 837.
Id.
"Id.
11d. at 837; see Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 794-95 (4th Cir. 1971).
10444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971).
"Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 319 F. Supp. 835 (M.D.N.C. 1970).
lid. at 842.
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company's prior policy of racial discrimination in hiring 3 and was thus
illegal under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1
Title VII deals with racial discrimination in labor practices and is
one of eleven sections of the Civil Rights Act, a comprehensive statute
formulated to attack institutionalized racial discrimination on many
fronts.' 5 Section 703 of Title VII states that an employer may not law-
fully "fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges or employment" because of his race,
color, religion, sex or national origin, or to "limit, segregate, or classify
his employees in any way which would . . . deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee."'" Labor organizations are similarly prohibited from acts of
discrimination. 7 Mrs. Robinson, as plaintiff, in her individual capacity
and representative of the class of all persons hired into all-Black depart-
ments under the discriminatory policy, sued Lorillard Corporation
under section 703 and alleged that the seniority system as it had evolved
effectively kept them from advancement into higher paying depart-
ments. Transferring would have required that plaintiffs forfeit their
accumulated seniority and, in many cases forced them to take an actual
cut in pay. Plaintiffs argued that because they were Black and because
they were hired into the lowest paying "Black" departments, they had
had no chance of being anywhere else in the hiearchy of jobs.' s For
example, if two workers, one Black and one White, went to work prior
to 1962 on the same day, the White worker would begin in a department
paying a higher wage and offering more responsibility. Even after all
racial discrimination was eliminated in present employee selection pro-
cedures, the Black employee would never attain seniority on a parity
with the White worker under a system of job or departmental seniority.
This, Mrs. Robinson argued, was discriminatory under section 703. She
'3444 F.2d at 794-95; 319 F. Supp. at 842.
"Civil Rights Act of 1964 [hereinafter cited as Act] §§ 701-716, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-
15 (1970). For a recent analysis of the application of Title VII to seniority systems, see Note,
Employment Discrimination and Title Ill of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1109,
1155-66 (1971).
1542 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000h (1970). The index of Chapter 21 of 42 U.S.C. at 10279-10281 gives
an informative outline of the scope of the Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970), giving the scope of
the Act.
"Act § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970).
"I1d. § 703(d), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1970).
IgRobinson v. Lorillard Corp., 319 F. Supp. 835, 837 (M.D.N.C. 1970).
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pointed to evidence (not uncontradicted, but accepted by the court) that
in spite of the transfer provision in the 1962 agreement, 85 per cent of
the Blacks and 97 per cent of the Whites hired prior to 1962 had not
transferred departments. 9 Apparently the dual factors of sacrifice of
seniority rights and the possibility of a cut in pay "operated as built-in
headwinds" 0 which offered resistance to the aspirations of Black work-
ers.
Mrs. Robinson convinced the district court that the Lorillard sen-
iority system was discriminatory. The court ordered the system restruc-
tured and granted the plaintiffs an award of back pay that has been
calculated to be in excess of 500,000 dollars.2' However, the court denied
attorneys' fees to the plaintiff.
22
On appeal Lorillard Corporation admitted a policy of racial dis-
crimination prior to 1962, but argued that its seniority system did not
retain the effects of that discrimination. Even if it did, the company
argued, it was insulated from attack by provisions of Title VII that set
certain exceptions and limitations to the inclusive wording of section
703.
Lorillard first argued that even if the system might show some
effects of discrimination, it was not illegal unless "the court finds that
the respondent has intentionally engaged in . . . an unlawful employ-
ment practice.2 3 Intent, however, in the employment context has been
interpreted to mean "only that the defendant meant to do what he did,
that is, his employment practice was not accidental. ' 24 A judicial inter-
pretation of "intent" in regard to Title VII cases was formulated by the
Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.2 15 There the court said,
"[C]ongress directed the thrust of the Act (Civil Rights Act of 1964) to
the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motiva-
tion,' 2' adding that "good intent or absence of discriminatory intent
does not redeem employment procedures ' 2 otherwise found discrimina-
tory.
"Id. at 840.
"444 F.2d at 797. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1970).
2"Letter from C. Allen Foster, Attorney for Lorillard Corporation, to Lee A. Patterson, II,
January 21, 1972.
"319 F. Supp. at 843.
23Act § 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970).
21444 F.2d 791, 796 quoting Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States,
416 F.2d 980, 996 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
"401 U.S. 424 (1971).
"Id. at 432 (emphasis in the original).
vId.
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Failing on the issue of intent, Lorillard next argued that its system
of seniority was acceptable as "bona fide" under Section 703(h).18 This
section states, "Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter,
its shall not be . . .unlawful . . . for an employer to apply different
standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system...
provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to
discriminate .. ".. -2 Again arguing that there was no "intent" to dis-
criminate, Lorillard submitted that this exception would render its sen-
iority system acceptable under the law.
Rejecting this contention, the circuit court cited the first case of
major impact regarding discriminatory effects of a seniority system:
Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc. 0 There the court said, "Obviously one
characteristic of a bonafide seniority system must be lack of discrimina-
tion."' 3' The court accepted the idea that Congress could not have
intended "to freeze an entire generation of Negro employees into dis-
criminatory patterns that existed before the act.
32
A federal district court sitting in Virginia in a case subsequent to
Robinson summarized the law in the Fourth Circuit. "[T]he law in this
circuit is that if an employee still suffers the effects of past discrimina-
tory acts, even though the employer's policy may have changed, he is
entitled to relief.
33
Failing in defenses arising from statutory interpretation, Lorillard
argued that if its system was based on a business purpose and was
organized so that it was "necessary to the safe and efficient operation
of the business,' 34 it could withstand attacks of discriminatory effect
on some employees. The basis of this argument is that even in the
enforcement of civil rights, the courts have not required changes in the
structure of the defendant business or corporation so severe as to drive
it out of business or seriously damage its safe and efficient operation.
This defense raised by Lorillard required the circuit court to formu-
late a test against which to measure the effects of reorganizing the
"Act § 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970). See Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d at
797.
29Act § 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970).
*1279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
'lid. at 517.
11Id. at 516.
"United States v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 3 FEP Cases 529, 533 (E.D. Va. 1971).
3'iones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 249 (10th Cir. 1970).
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seniority system. This test was that of "business necessity."35 Before
laying out the component parts of its own test, the court reviewed
formulations from other courts and jurisdictions.
The cases set out two different lines of decision. One upholds sen-
iority systems that are formally discriminatory on the basis of the need
for efficiency and safety. In cases where one job qualifies a worker for
the next along a line of progression, the need for ability and skill may
outweigh the desire to root out the last vestiges of discrimination." The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals commented that it would uphold a sys-
tem of seniority on the need of employees "to perform the jobs
satisfactorily and-more importantly-without danger of physical in-
jury to themselves and their fellow employees."37 One district court
commented, "The company is not required to forgo its legitimate inter-
est in maintaining the skill and efficiency of its labor force."3
The other line of decisions requires more than a mere showing of
greater safety or efficiency in the old discriminatory system than in a
proposed new one. Although no court as of yet has required an employer
"to place an unqualified employee into a particular job qualification," 9
some, following this second line of reasoning, have reflected the ap-
proach taken by the Second Circuit in United States v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp.,40 suggesting that qualification must be clearly proved essential
before it will be considered necessary. "Necessity connotes an irresisti-
ble demand. To be preserved, the seniority and transfer system must not
only directly foster safety and efficiency of a plant, but also be essential
to those goals."41 The Tenth Circuit rejected defense arguments that
allowing transfer in violation of the existing discriminatory agreement
would increase costs and create problems with the negotiating unions."
"Some have asserted that no amount of business purpose should be
accepted as justification for a seniority system with a significant detri-
3In Griggs, the Supreme Court set out a test of "business necessity" stating, "If an employ-
ment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance,
the practice is prohibited." 401 U.S. at 431.
"6United States v. H. K. Porter Co., 296 F. Supp. 40, 91 (N.D. Ala. 1968).
'7Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 993 (5th
Cir. 1969), quoting United States v. H. K. Porter Co., 296 F. Supp. 40, 90 (N.D. Ala. 1968).
3'United States v. Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers, 301 F. Supp. 906, 917
(E.D. La. 1969).
"United States v. Virginia Electric & Power Co. (E.D. Va. 1971) 3 FEP Cases 529, 536.
40446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971).
11d. at 662.
"Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 249 (10th Cir. 1970).
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mental impact on minorities."4
Weighing the two lines of authority, the Robinson court accepted
this second view, placing an extreme burden on the defendant company
to clearly demonstrate the business necessity of its practice. It couched
its test for business necessity in terms of "overriding legitimate business
purpose. . . necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the business
.... sufficiently compelling to override any racial impact. . .[with]
no acceptable alternative policies or practices."" In effect, this test is a
judicial amalgamation of those offered by the Second and Tenth Cir-
cuits, extending the scope and coverage beyond either of those circuit's
individual tests.
45
Against this formulation, the "business purposes" offered by the
company had little chance for success. The arguments that extra admin-
istrative expenses would be involved in changing the system and that the
same system was working in other places were summarily dismissed.46
Evidence of pressure from the union to adopt the existing system was
also rejected as insufficient for business necessity. 47 The assertion that
an alteration of the system would adversely affect "efficiency, economy,
and morale" was also found insufficient.4" Finally, a stepping-stone
theory of progressive job advancement, with one job serving as neces-
sary training fot the next, was rejected as unsupported by the facts. The
district court in Robinson explained that higher level jobs in the com-
pany were simply not so difficult that they required a stepping-stone
approach, pointing out that between 1956 and 1968 all employees who
transferred between unrelated departments were successful at their new
jobs.49 It was equally damning that the seniority system granted as relief
by the district court and appealed from by the company was precisely
the same system offered by the company to and rejected by the union
in collective bargaining three years earlier."
The argument that the new system would disappoint the expecta-
"Note, Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, supra note
14, at 1163.
"444 F.2d at 798.
"See the Robinson court's discussion of these tests. 444 F.2d at 797.
"Id. at 798-79. See Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 249-50 (10th Cir.
1970).
11444 F.2d at 799.
"sId.
"Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 319 F. Supp. 835, 840 (M.D.N.C. 1970).
"444 F.2d at 799.
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tions of the White workers was rejected as a necessary price to pay in
the achievement of equality in opportunity. On this point, the Bethlehem
Steel court stated, "If relief under Title VII can be denied merely be-
cause the majority group of employees, who have not suffered discrimi-
nation, will be unhappy about it, there will be little hope of correcting
the wrongs to which the Act is directed."'"
Mrs. Robinson and her fellow plaintiffs won a total victory before
the circuit court. The court not only upheld the restructuring of the
seniority system and awarded back pay, but also reversed the lower
court and granted attorneys' fees.52 These fees and out-of-pocket expen-
ses were estimated to be in excess of 225,000 dollars. 3
In reversing the district court on attorneys' fees the circuit court
quoted its own memorandum opinion, Lea v. Cone Mills, Inc.,"' which
granted attorneys' fees to a plaintiff in a Title VII suit on the authority
of Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises.55 There the Supreme Court
required attorneys' fees awards in cases under Title II of the Civil
Rights Act.5" Title II outlaws discrimination in public accomodationsY
The Supreme Court in Piggie Park commented that attorneys' fees
should be required because plaintiffs under that section were acting in
fact as "private attorneys-general," winning rights for all affected by
violations of the public accomodations section.58 Under Title II as under
Title VII, there is no allowance for monetary relief. 9
The dissent in Cone Mills pointed out the differences between pos-
sible relief under Titles II and VII, and added that under both titles the
authority to grant attorneys' fees was in the discretion of the trial judge,
so that in the absence of a ruling from the Supreme Court on Title VII
11446 F.2d at 663.
52444 F.2d at 804.
-Letter from C. Allen Foster, attorney for P. Lorillard Corporation, to Lee A. Patterson,
11, January 21, 1972.
The court also upheld the district court order of the adoption by the company of a procedure
of "red circling" which would allow a transferee to retain his former rate of pay in his new job,
regardless of the level at which the new job started, until the transferee reached a level where the
pay rate equalled or exceeded that of his former job. 444 F.2d at 799.
51438 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
-390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam). See Lea v. Cone Mills, Inc., 438 F.2d at 88.
"Id. at 402; Act § 204(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1970).
5"Act §§ 201-207, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6 (1970).
"390 U.S. at 402.
"For remedies available under Title II, see Act §§ 204, 207(b), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3, 2000a-
6(b) (1970). Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per curiam).
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analogous to Piggie Park on Title II (which converted the discretionary
grant of attorney's fees into a mandatory order) the lower court should
not be reversed without a showing of abuse of discretion. 0 The legisla-
tive history of Title VII would support the Lorillard court's decision on
the attorneys' fes, but this was not mentioned.6 The court was appar-
ently confident in resting its holding on the Cone Mills precedent.
Robinson v. Lorillard is a decision of great importance to employer
and employees alike. Although it does not appear to completely resolve
the problems of Title VII litigation, it clearly defines the terms in which
such cases will be argued. The court's formulation of its "business ne-
cessity test" puts any company defendant on notice that it faces signifi-
cant obstacles in proving that its seniority system is essential to safe and
efficient operation. Perhaps nothing will suffice short of a tightly struc-
tured seniority plan where one job trains a worker for the next and
where experience is proven necessary for progression as well as the
training.
1*438 F.2d at 90-91. In Newman, the Supreme Court commented "[O]ne who succeeds under
that Title (Title II) should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would
render such an award unjust." 391 U.S. at 402.
The plaintiffs, in their cross-appeal brief before the circuit court, cited several cases where
attorneys' fees were awarded to plaintiffs in Title VII cases. While these cases clearly show that
the attorneys' fees may be granted, none support the proposition that the denial of them by a
district judge is an abuse of discretion. Brief for Appellee at 12, Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444
F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971). See, e.g., Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th
Cir. 1970); Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 959, 962 (N.D. III. 1970); Clark v.
American Marine Corp., 304 F. Supp. 603, 611 (E.D. La. 1969); Richards v. Griffith Rubber Mills,
300 F. Supp. 338, 341 (D. Ore. 1969); Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 521 (E.D.
Va. 1968); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 272 F. Supp. 332, 367 (S.D. Ind. 1967), rev'd in part
416 F.2d 711 (1969).
The plaintiffs also cite cases upholding the idea mentioned in Newman that a plaintiff in a
discrimination case acts not only for himself, but also as a "private attorney general" to correct
wrongs injuring the community at large. 390 U.S. at 402. They are Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive
Co., 416 F.2d 711, 7)9-20 (7th Cir. 1969); Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 32-33 (5th
Cir. 1968); Oatis v. Crown Zellerback Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1968). Brief for Appellee
at 14, Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971). Although these cases do give
precedent for analogizing Title VII to Title II as interpreted by Newman, they do not speak to
the point of overruling a district judge declining to grant attorneys' fees.
"When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 first passed the House, it allowed any member of the
Equal Employment Opportunities Commission to file a charge against an employer. 110 CONG.
REc. 13693 (1964) (Remarks of Senator Humphrey). This procedure was changed in the Senate
to require an aggrieved worker to bring suit or to allow the Attorney General to bring action
against the employer. Act §§ 706(e), 707(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(e), 2000e-6(a) (1970). There-
fore there is some legislative history that suggests that there was intent to encourage workers
injured by an employment practice made illegal by the title to bring suit without the inhibiting
factor of possibly being saddled with the cost of attorney's fees.
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Robinson clearly places the burden of proof and persuasion on the
defendant company to show that its seniority system is not discrimina-
tory or that it is necessary. The plaintiff apparently needs only to prove
that the company once practiced racial discrimination, and that there
are workers presently with the company who were affected by it. This
fact is brought home forcefully when one realizes that in Robinson the
plaintiff won virtually every point. In demands for relief, procedural
contests, and factual discrepancies, the court accepted the plaintiff's
argument.
62
Only time and subsequent litigation will tell how widely the sweep
of the Robinson opinion will be in other situations and in other indus-
tries. The tobacco and textile industries of this state could be greatly
effected. The expenses and attorneys' fees awarded to the plaintiffs
approach 750,000 dollars. Such an award could seriously affect the
profits and business lives of many of the marginal industries in the
South.
Finally, this decision has a great impact on the working man, both
Black and White. Any decision that alters seniority rights affects what
is perhaps as important a right as has been developed in and been
protected by the collective bargaining system. 3 It is an unfortunate
necessity that the inequities of years of racial discrimination may only
be corrected by actions affecting the plans and aspirations of some
White workers who may be personally blameless for the situation.
62Lorillard Corporation filed a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court on September 24,
1971. In the brief of that petition, the company requested a reversal of the order of back pay for
the class of injured employees and a reversal of the court of appeals ruling allowing attorneys' fees.
Lorillard based its first reason for appeal upon the argument that back pay should not be granted
since they had operated their system of seniority in reliance on a letter from the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, filed July 27, 1966, holding that there was no reasonable cause to believe
that their system violated Title VII. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 8-11, filed Sept. 4, 1971.
The company also argued that the plaintiff had waived the claim for money damages in their brief
and in pretrial negotiations. Id. at 18-19.
The company also questioned the court's reversal of the district court's denial of attorneys'
fees, largely for the reasons expressed in the Cone Mills dissent. The company's brief on the
petition for certiorari distinguishes Newman on the grounds that under Title II, the plaintiff would
be acting as a "private attorney general," and if he were successful, he would attain an injunction
against the offending party rather than any money recovery. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at
15-17.
Pursuant to a settlement agreement between the two parties approved by the district court,
Lorillard Corporation withdrew its petition for certiorari. Letter from C. Allen Foster, Attorney
for Lorillard Corporation, to Lee A. Patterson, II, March 8, 1972.
1Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature and Enforceability of Seniority Rights, 75 HARV.
L. REv. 1532, 1534-35 (1962).
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Robinson v. Lorillard demonstrates at least two important princi-
ples regarding the elimination of racial discrimination in employment.
First, it shows the vigor with which the courts will attack the system that
shows the signs of perpetuating discrimination. Secondly, it reveals that
the costs of this necessary effort are very high.
LEE A. PATTERSON, II
Private Prosecution-The Entrenched Anomaly
Since the days of our Constitution's infancy, traditional judicial
truisms have been superseded by the viable doctrines of "due process,"
"equal protection," and "judicial fairness." Notwithstanding this evolu-
tion, there remain seemingly impregnable citadels of judicial tradition.
One such remnant of the past is the policy allowing private prosecution
in criminal actions. Recently in State v. Best,' the North Carolina Su-
preme Court reiterated 2 its stand condoning the practice.
I. BACKGROUND AND STATE OF LAW
At common law criminal prosecution adhered to the pure form of
the adversary system; each aggrieved party retained his own counsel to
prosecute his private interest. The private prosecutor had the case laid
before the grand jury and took charge of the trial before the petit jury.3
Despite statutory provisions requiring a public prosecutorial system4
and judicial repudiation of the procedure in some jurisdictions5 private
prosecution remains well entrenched.6
While adhering to the philosophy of the common law rule, the
North Carolina courts have modified its application. Whereas the clas-
1280 N.C. 413, 186 S.E.2d 1 (1972).
2See, e.g., State v. Westbrook, 279 N.C. 18, 181 S.E.2d 572 (1971); State v. Lippard, 223 N.C.
167, 25 S.E.2d 594 (1943); State v. Carden, 209 N.C. 404, 183 S.E. 898, cert. denied, 298 U.S.
682 (1936); State v. Davis, 203 N.C. 13, 164 S.E. 737 (1932).
3State v. Carden, 209 N.C. 404, 410, 183 S.E. 898, 902, cert. denied, 298 U.S. 682 (1936).
See generally 42 AM. JUR. Prosecuting Attorneys § 10 (1942).
'E.g., N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 18; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-61 (Supp. 1971).
5E.g., McKay v. State, 90 Neb. 63, 132 N.W. 741 (1911); Bird v. State, 77 Wis. 276,45 N.W.
1126 (1890); Biemel v. State, 71 Wis. 444, 37 N.W. 244 (1888).
$E.g., Handley v. State, 214 Ala. 172, 106 So. 692, 694-95 (1925); Robinson v. State, 69 Fla.
521, 68 So. 649 (1915); State v. Bartlett, 105 Md. 212, 74 A. 18 (1909); State v. Westbrook, 279
N.C. 18, 181 S.E.2d 572 (1971).
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